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Landlord-Tenant Law: Abolition of Self-Help in
Minnesota
Rodney Wiley leased property to Kathleen Berg, who operated a
restaurant on the premises. Their written lease imposed certain re-
strictions on the tenant,' and gave the landlord the right to reenter
and take possession of the property if the tenant violated the restric-
tions.2 After a series of disputes between Berg and Wiley during the
first two years of the lease term,3 Wiley asserted that Berg had vio-
lated the restrictions in the lease, thereby entitling Wiley to retake
possession.4 Two weeks later, Wiley, accompanied by a locksmith and
a police officer, changed the locks and took possession of the premises
while Berg was absent. Berg brought an unlawful detainer action and,
in a separate action, sought damages for lost profits, damage to chat-
tels, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on claims
1. The restrictions were contained in lease items 5 and 6:
Item #5 The Lessee will make no changes to the building structure without
first receiving written authorization from the Lessor. The Lessor will
promptly reply in writing to each request and will cooperate with the Lessee
on any reasonable request.
Item #6 The Lessee agrees to operate the restaurant in a lawful and prudent
manner during the lease period.
Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 147 n.1 (Minn. 1978).
2. The reentry clause provided, "Item #7 Should the Lessee fail to meet the
conditions of this Lease the Lessor may at their [sic] option retake possession of said
premises." Id.
3. The discord between Wiley and Berg was initially caused by the continual
state of disrepair of the premises due to remodeling. Wiley alleged that Berg had
started remodeling projects without the written approval required by lease item #5. See
note 1 supra. Two events precipitated the dispute over the remodeling. First, in order
to protect the substantial investment that would accompany additional remodeling of
the premises, Berg requested either a renewal of the lease or a new five year lease.
Appellants' Brief, app. at A-4. Second, Berg incorporated the business, with herself
as sole stockholder, and requested an assignment of the lease to the corporation. See
id. at A-7. Wiley refused both requests, citing as the basis for the denial Berg's previous
failure to obtain approval for remodeling. Id. at A-5 to -6. In spite of Wiley's refusal,
the corporation began paying the rent, which was accepted, and Berg began several
new remodeling projects.
4. Wiley's assertions were contained in a letter listing eight separate demands.
See Appellants' Brief, app. at A-14 to -16. He insisted on compliance with the demands
within two weeks and threatened to exercise his option to retake possession under lease
item 7, see note 2 supra, if the deadline was not met. One of Wiley's demands was that
the restaurant be approved by the state and city health departments. Earlier, the
Minnesota Department of Health had inspected the restaurant and ordered that a
number of code violations be corrected. 264 N.W.2d at 147. Several of Wiley's other
demands were similar to orders by the Department of Health in response to code
violations. At the end of the two week period, Wiley's demands had not been met. Id.
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in wrongful eviction, contract, and tort.' The trial court found that
Berg had been wrongfully evicted, and awarded her damages for lost
profits and loss of chattels. The trial court based its finding of wrong-
ful eviction on two grounds. First, Wiley's repossession was not peace-
able and, therefore, was wrongful under the common law. Second,
even if Wiley had acted peaceably, modern doctrine requires a land-
lord to resort to judicial process to secure possession from a tenant
who refuses to surrender the premises.7 On appeal, the Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "the only lawful means to
dispossess a tenant who has not abandoned nor voluntarily surren-
dered but who claims possession adversely to a landlord's claim of
breach of a written lease is by resort to judicial process." Berg v.
Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 151 (Minn. 1978).
The early common law permitted landlords to forcibly dispossess
tenants who were not legally entitled to possession.' The right to use
force was restricted in England by a statute enacted in 1381 that
made forcible entry a criminal offense.' The initial statute was fol-
5. The damage action was suspended for the duration of the separate unlawful
detainer action brought under MINN. STAT. §§ 566.01-.17 (1974) (amended 1976). After
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that an unlawful detainer action is not available
to a tenant against his landlord, Berg v. Wiley, 303 Minn. 247, 251, 226 N.W.2d 904,
907 (1975), proceedings in the damage action were resumed. 264 N.W.2d at 148 & n.2.
6. The claims in wrongful eviction and intentional infliction of emotional distress
were submitted to the jury by special verdict. The jury found no liability for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Based on the finding of wrongful eviction, however, the
jury awarded damages of $31,000 for lost profits and $3,540 for loss of chattels. 264
N.W.2d at 148.
7. Id. at 149.
8. The common law right to use force was available to any person entitled to the
possession of land, not only to those in the relationship of landlord and tenant. 1 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, TH LAw oF ToRTS § 3.15 (1956).
9. 5 Rich. 2, c. 7 (1381) provided,
And also the King defendeth, That none from henceforth make any entry
into any lands and tenements, but in case where entry is given by the law;
and in such case not with strong hand, nor with multitude of people, but only
in peaceable and easy manner. (2) And if any man from henceforth do to the
contrary, and thereof be duly convict, he shall be punished by imprisonment
of his body, and thereof ransomed at the King's will.
In Taunton v. Costar, 101 Eng. Rep. 1060 (K.B. 1797), the court held that the statutory
remedy was exclusive and that no civil cause of action could be maintained by the
person dispossessed. Lord Kenyon reasoned,
The case is too plain for argument. Here is a tenant from year to year,
whose term expired upon a proper notice to quit, and because he holds over
in defiance of law and justice, he now attempts to convert the lawful entry
of his landlord into a trespass. If an action of trespass had been brought, it
is clear that the landlord could have justified under a pleas of liberum tene-
mentum. If indeed the landlord had entered with a strong hand to dispossess
the tenant by force, he might have been indicted for a forcible entry: but
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lowed by others,"0 which served as models for forcible entry and detai-
ner" statutes enacted in the United States.2
Although the first American statutes made forcible entry and
detainer criminal offenses, most states have replaced the criminal
sanctions 3 with a civil remedy that allows summary recovery of the
there can be no doubt of his right to enter upon the land at the expiration of
the term. There is not the slightest pretence for considering him as a tres-
passer in this case ....
Id. at 1060-61. The courts in two later cases, however, awarded damages to dispos-
sessed tenants who brought civil actions against their former landlords. Newton v.
Harland, 133 Eng. Rep. 490, 496, 500 (C.P. 1840)(action for assault); Hillary v. Gay,
172 Eng. Rep. 1243, 1244 (Ex. 1833)(action for breaking and entering, expulsion, and
taking of tenant's goods). Many English courts disregarded Newton and Hillary, and
sanctioned forcible dispossession by landlords having a right to possession. See, e.g.,
Lows v. Telford, 1 App. Cas. 414, 423 (1876) (landlord retained right of possession
following forcible reentry); Harvey v. Brydges, 153 Eng. Rep. 546, 548 (Ex. 1845)
(freeholder who dispossesses wrongfully possessing tenant by force is not liable to
tenant, "although the freeholder may be responsible to the public in the shape of an
indictment for forcible entry"). Newton was expressly overruled by a subsequent case,
Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club, Ltd., [1920] 1 K.B. 720, 737-38, 747, 753 (1919).
10. A series of forcible entry and detainer statutes were enacted in England
between 1381 and 1623. These statutes were generally available to dispossessed land-
owners and did not apply only to landlords and tenants. In addition to 5 Rich. 2, c. 7
(1381), see note 9 supra, the statutes were: 15 Rich. 2, c. 2 (1391), which prohibited
forcible entry followed by forcible detainer and compelled justices to act upon forcible
entry complaints; 4 Hen. 4, c. 8 (1402), which provided a civil remedy to dispossessed
freeholders; 8 Hen. 6, c. 9 (1429), which prohibited forcible detainer following a peacea-
ble entry and altered freeholders' civil remedies to include restitution and treble dam-
ages; and 21 Jac. 1, c. 15 (1623), which extended to tenants for a term of years the
civil remedies created by 4 Hen. 4, c. 8 (1402) and 8 Hen. 6, c. 9 (1429).
It should be noted that the civil remedies expressly created by these statutes were
limited to dispossessed freeholders and tenants for a term of years. The civil remedies
were therefore not available to tenants no longer entitled to possession who had been
forcibly evicted by their landlords. See Barnett, When the Landlord Resorts to Self-
Help: A Plea for Clarification of the Law in Florida, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 238 (1966);
Note, Right of a Landlord to Regain Possession by Force, 4 AM. L. Rxv. 429 (1869);
Comment, Defects in the Current Forcible Entry and Detainer Laws of the United
States and England, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1067 (1978).
11. 5 Rich. 2, c. 7 (1381), prohibited only forcible entries, lut later English
statutes extended the prohibition to forcible detainers. See note 10 supra. Although
forcible entry and detainer are closely related, the two terms are distinct. Forcible
entry is generally an entry on real property in the possession of another without legal
right and with some degree of force. In contrast, detainer, which may or may not be
preceded by a forcible entry, is the unlawful holding of real property. See Schroeder
v. Woody, 166 Or. 93, 96, 109 P.2d 597, 599 (1941); Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428,
437, 150 P.2d 100, 104 (1944). See generally 35 AM. JuR. 2D Forcible Entry and Detainer
§ 1 (1967).
12. Note, supra note 10, at 430.
13. For a list of the states where forcible entry and detainer remain crimes, see
Comment, supra note 10, at 1077 n.50.
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property.'4 Generally, if the tenant is unlawfully in possession,'" the
summary recovery statute affords the landlord summary restitution
of the premises through an unlawful detainer proceeding.' Alterna-
tively, if the tenant is in lawful possession and is dispossessed by the
landlord, the statute gives the tenant summary restitution of the
premises."
The landlord may choose to evict the tenant through self-help
rather than judicial proceedings. If the self-help is deemed forcible,
however, most states hold the landlord liable to the tenant for dam-
ages, regardless of whether the tenant's possession was lawful or
unlawful.' The theories of recovery vary depending on the circum-
14. Because the proceeding is summary, the range of issues that may be litigated
is limited. Generally, legal title or the ultimate right to possession will not be consid-
ered by the court; the dispossessed person need only prove the immediate right to
possession. For example, if a tenant is unlawfully in possession, the immediate right
to possession is in the landlord or successor lessee. Possession will be granted to the
proper person by the summary recovery statute. Similarly, if a tenant lawfully in
possession is dispossessed, the immediate right to possession remains in the tenant
although title and the ultimate right to possession are in the landlord. The summary
recovery statute will restore possession to the tenant. See, e.g., Daluiso v. Boone, 71
Cal. 2d 484, 495-96, 455 P.2d 811, 817-18, 78 Cal. Rptr. 707, 713-14 (1969); Keller v.
Henvit, 219 Minn. 580, 585, 18 N.W.2d 544, 547 (1945). See generally 35 AM. JUR. 2D
Forcible Entry and Detainer §§ 14-27 (1967). The civil proceeding under the statute is
not intended to be the exclusive remedy available to the dispossessed person. Other
actions such as trespass or ejectment may be brought. See, e.g., Henschke v. Young,
226 Minn. 339, 341, 32 N.W.2d 854, 855 (1948); Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Berg,
187 Minn. 503, 505, 246 N.W. 9, 10 (1932); American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah
2d 432, 434-35, 464 P.2d 592, 593-94 (1970) (Ellett, J., concurring).
15. A tenant's possession is unlawful in the following situations: 1) if he has
retained possession after the expiration of the tenancy and the landlord chooses not to
hold him to another term, see 49 AM. Ju. 2D Landlord and Tenant §§ 1115-1116
(1970); and 2) if the tenant has breached a condition that the lease states will result
in forfeiture and the landlord elects to terminate the lease. See id. §§ 1021-1022.
16. In addition to the unlawful detainer action, the landlord is entitled to bring
a separate action to recover damages equal to the fair rental value of the property for
the period of its detention. Under appropriate circumstances, special damages may
also be recovered. 1 AMEiucAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.36 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
17. See, e.g., Smith v. Hegg, 88 S.D. 29, 214 N.W.2d 789 (1974). See generally
52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 460(1) (1968). In addition to recovering the premises
through the summary proceeding, the tenant is entitled to bring a separate damage
action. The theories of recovery available to a tenant whose possession is lawful are
the same as those available to a tenant evicted by force. See notes 19-24 infra and
accompanying text. A minority of jurisdictions, including Minnesota, prohibit tenants
from prosecuting their landlords under the forcible entry and detainer statutes. The
Minnesota Supreme Court held in Berg v. Wiley, 303 Minn. 247, 250, 226 N.W.2d 904,
906 (1975), that MmIN. STAT. § 566.03 (1) (1974) (amended 1976), excludes tenants
from the classes of plaintiffs who may sue for possession in unlawful detainer proceed-
ings. See note 5 supra. According to the court, the tenant's proper remedy is an action
in ejectment. 303 Minn. at 251, 226 N.W.2d at 907.
18. W. PROSSER, HANDROOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 23 (4th ed. 1971). See
[Vol. 63:723
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stances,'9 but the tenant may generally recover actual damages-
including those for physical injury, 0 emotional distress, 2' lost prof-
its,22 and damage to property'-as well as punitive damages. 2
If a landlord retakes possession from a tenant in unlawful posses-
sion through peaceable self-help, the majority of states do not hold
the landlord liable to the tenant.2 In many states, however, the range
of peaceable 6 entries is narrow; courts have been willing to find forci-
generally Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 177 (1966).
A small number of states follow the rule that allows the landlord to use reasonable
force to regain possession. In these states, the landlord is not liable to the tenant for
the use of reasonable force even if actual damage results. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Abram-
son, 363 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1966) (Virginia); Paddock v. Clay, 138 Mont. 541, 357 P.2d
1 (1960).
In all states, a landlord is liable to the tenant for the use of excessive force. 1 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 8, at 259; W. PROSSER, supra.
19. The theories most often utilized are: 1) wrongful eviction (see, e.g., Malcolm
v. Little, 295 A.2d 711 (Del. 1972); Freeway Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western States Whole-
sale Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P.2d 778 (1969)); 2) conversion (see, e.g., Polley v.
Shoemaker, 201 Neb. 91, 266 N.W.2d 222 (1978)); 3) trespass to chattels (see, e.g.,
Price v. Osborne, 24 Tenn. App. 525, 147 S.W.2d 412 (1940)); and 4) assault and
battery (see, e.g., Chapman v. Johnson, 39 App. Div. 2d 629, 331 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1972);
Nelson v. Swanson, 177 Wash. 187, 31 P.2d 521 (1934)). See also W. PROSSER, supra
note 18.
20. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Abramson, 363 F.2d 865, 866 (4th Cir. 1966); Nelson
v. Swanson, 177 Wash. 187, 191, 31 P.2d 521, 522 (1934).
21. See, e.g., Peterson v. Platt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 331, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (1965).
22. See, e.g., Weber v. McMillan, 285 So. 2d 349, 352 (La. Ct. App. 1973);
Freeway Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western States Wholesale Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266, 272-
73, 451 P.2d 778, 783 (1969).
23. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Daspit, 245 So. 2d 506, 506-07 (La. Ct. App. 1971);
Price v. Osborne, 24 Tenn. App. 525, 527, 147 S.W.2d 412, 413 (1940).
24. See, e.g., Robert L. Merwin & Co. v. Strong, 429 F.2d 50, 52-53 (3d Cir. 1970);
Peterson v. Platt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 331, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (1965).
25. See, e.g., Krasner v. Gurley, 252 Ala. 235, 40 So. 2d 328 (1949); Calef v.
Jesswein, 93 Ind. App. 514, 176 N.E. 632 (1931); Chappee v. Lubrite Refining Co., 337
Mo. 791, 85 S.W.2d 1034 (1935); Simhiser v. Farber, 270 Wis. 420, 71 N.W.2d 412
(1955). See generally 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Reporter's Note § 14.2,
note 1 at 16 (1977); Annot., supra note 18. Of course, if the tenant is in lawful posses-
sion and is evicted by the landlord, the landlord is liable to the tenant for damages
regardless of whether the eviction is forcible or peaceable. See note 17 supra.
26. In defining "peaceable," courts generally refer to the forcible entry and de-
tainer statute in effect in their jurisdiction. For this reason, modem revisions of the
statutory language become significant. Early American statutes generally incorporated
the language of the English forcible entry statute and prohibited entry "with strong
hand" or "with multitude of people." See note 9 supra. This language was construed
in both England and the United States as prohibiting only the use of actual force. See,
e.g., Fort Dearborn Lodge v. Klein, 115 IIl. 177, 3 N.E. 272 (1885). Through statutory
revision, however, many states have replaced this language with less explicit language
that is construed to prohibit acts not involving actual force. For example, compare
IOWA REv. STAT. ch. 86, art. XII, § 2 (1843) ("[i]f any person shall enter upon or into
19791
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ble entries in cases in which only minimal force was actually used.
For example, entries made with the assistance of a locksmith," with
a passkey," and through an open window,2 although made in the
tenant's absence and with no actual violence, have been held to be
forcible within the meaning of the forcible entry and detainer stat-
utes.
A growing minority of states prohibit self-help entirely. This
approach abrogates the common law right of reentry in all cases and
requires landlords to use judicial means to regain possession from
tenants unlawfully in possession.2 Under this rule, tenants can re-
cover damages whenever self-help is used, even if actual violence does
not occur.3' When no damages are suffered by the tenant, nominal
damages may be awarded.
32
Prior to Berg, Minnesota case law concerning self-help evictions
focused primarily on whether the landlord was legally entitled to
possession when he dispossessed the tenant, rather than on whether
the entry was forcible or peaceable.3 The earliest Minnesota case to
discuss the manner in which a landlord may repossess premises was
Mercil v. Broulette.3 1 In Mercil, a case involving the right of an owner
of cropland to dispossess a trespasser who had lived on and cultivated
any lands, tenements, or other possessions, and detain and hold same with force or
strong hand," then that person "shall be deemed guilty of a forcible entry and detai-
ner"), with IowA CODE § 648.1(1) (1977) (allows a summary remedy for forcible entry
or detention "[w]here the defendant has by force, intimidation, fraud, or stealth
entered upon the prior actual possession of another in real property, and detains the
same").
27. Karp v. Margolis, 159 Cal. App. 2d 69, 323 P.2d 557 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
In Karp, the landlord had even given prior notice of his intention to the local police.
28. Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100 (1944). In Buchanan, the
landlord had removed the doors from their hinges after entering.
29. McNeil v. Higgins, 86 Cal. App. 2d 723, 195 P.2d 470 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
30. See, e.g., Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 605, 361 P.2d 20, 24, 12 Cal. Rptr.
488, 492 (1961); Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d 711, 713-14 (Del. 1972); Weber v. McMil-
lan, 285 So. 2d 349, 351 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Bass v. Boetel & Co., 191 Neb. 733, 739,
217 N.W.2d 804, 807 (1974); Edwards v. C.N. Inv. Co., 27 Ohio Misc. 57, 62, 272
N.E.2d 652, 655 (Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1971). See generally 2 RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF PROPERTY § 14.2 (1977); Annot., supra note 18.
31. See, e.g., Daluiso v. Boone, 71 Cal. 2d 484, 500, 455 P.2d 811, 821, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 707, 717 (1969) (compensatory damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress awarded); Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d 711, 714 (Del. 1972) (punitive damages
awarded); Polley v. Shoemaker, 201 Neb. 91, 266 N.W.2d 222 (1978) (discussion of
tenant's cause of action based on conversion); Freeway Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western
States Wholesale Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266, 272-73, 451 P.2d 778, 783 (1969)(jury may
award damages for lost profits).
32. See, e.g., King v. Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 426-27, 285 P.2d 1114, 1119 (1955).
33. See 264 N.W.2d at 149; note 39 infra.
34. 66 Minn. 416, 69 N.W. 218 (1896).
[Vol. 63:723
SELF-HELP
the land for a number of years,35 the court held that a person lawfully
entitled to possession had the right to enter in a peaceable manner
even while another occupied the premises. 6 Thus, in Mercil, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court adopted the common law majority rule al-
lowing a landlord to reenter the premises when he was legally entit-
led to possession and his reentry was peaceable.3 7 The Mercil rule was
reaffirmed in Lobdell v. Keene' and was followed until Berg.39 The
Berg court overruled Mercil and adopted the minority rule requiring
landlords to use judicial means to dispossess tenants. 0 In noting that
35. The plaintiff-owner entered on and cultivated the land in the spring of 1894.
Although the defendant, who had previously lived on and worked the land, was no
longer occupying it, one of his sons was living there. The son announced that the
plaintiff was forbidden to work the land, but neither attempted to cultivate it himself,
nor made any further objection to plaintiff's presence. In the fall, defendant and two
of his sons took possession of the grain cultivated by the plaintiff. The plaintiff comm-
enced an action in claim and delivery for the grain. Id. at 417-18, 69 N.W. at 219. The
court does not mention any possible adverse possession claim by the defendant.
36. Id. at 418, 69 N.W. at 219.
37. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the types of
liability a landlord may incur in unlawfully dispossessing a tenant, see notes 18-24
supra and accompanying text.
38. 85 Minn. 90, 88 N.W. 426 (1901). In Lobdell, the defendant landlord re-
strained the tenant's son while the defendant's father took possession of the leased
premises. The defendant then joined his father in the building. When the tenant tried
to enter, the defendant shot him. Id. at 93-94, 88 N.W. at 426-27. In the resulting
damage action for assault and battery, the court reaffirmed the Mercil rule that a
landlord may enter peaceably if he is entitled to possession, but found that the defen-
dant neither was entitled to possession nor entered peaceably. Id. at 96-97, 88 N.W.
at 428. Since the reentry in Mercil was clearly peaceful and the reentry in Lobdell was
clearly forcible, neither case required the court to make a fine distinction between a
peaceable and a forcible entry.
39. Prior to Berg, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided several other cases in
addition to Lobdell that involved the repossession of premises by landlords. The deci-
sions, however, were based on the question of the landlord's right to possession rather
than on the manner of reentering. See, e.g., Keller v. Henvit, 219 Minn. 580, 584-85,
18 N.W.2d 544, 546-47 (1945); State v. Brown, 203 Minn. 505, 506, 282 N.W. 136, 137
(1938).
40. See 264 N.W.2d at 151. Before adopting the minority rule, the court analyzed
the facts in Berg under the common law rule and concluded that Wiley's reentry was
forcible and therefore unlawful. The court acknowledged that no actual violence re-
sulted from Wiley's repossession but noted that the potential for violence existed. In
support of its finding that the reentry was forcible, the court cited Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1968). In Gulf Oil, a case with facts
similar to those in Berg, the Texas court found that a reentry made by picking the locks
in the tenant's absence, without his knowledge and without notification, was forcible.
Id. at 265; see 264 N.W.2d at 150.
The findings that the reentries in Berg and Gulf Oil were forcible cannot be
defended logically unless "peaceable" and "forcible" are redefined to mean entries
made pursuant to judicial process and those not made pursuant to judicial process,
respectively. Neither court, however, expressly adopted these definitions. The result
1979]
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a growing minority of states no longer permit landlords to use self-
help, the court observed that "there is no cause to sanction such
potentially disruptive self-help where adequate and speedy means are
provided for removing a tenant peacefully through judicial process."4 '
In reaching its result, the Minnesota court recognized a policy of
disfavoring the types of self-help that may lead to breaches of the
peace.4" This policy, which underlies both Minnesota case law and
statutes, is especially evident in the forcible entry and unlawful de-
tainer statute;43 early Minnesota cases indicated that such a statute
is intended "to prevent the acquisition of claimed rights by force and
violence"44 and "to prevent parties from taking the law into their own
hands."45 Under the statute, possession can be restored to a dispos-
sessed person in as few as three to ten days after a complaint is filed. 6
The availability of such a remedy obviates the need for self-help
repossession.
The court found further evidence of the policy in section 557.08
of the Minnesota Statutes, which, in certain cases, permits treble
damages to be awarded to persons forcibly evicted. Three statutes
adopted in 1975 also reflect the policy in that they create a summary
repossession procedure for residential tenants who are unlawfully
removed,47 authorize treble damages if a landlord interrupts utility
services to a residential tenant," and make the intentional interrup-
tion of utilities or the intentional and unlawful ouster of a tenant a
misdemeanor. 9
The rule adopted in Berg, as stated by the Minnesota court,"0
contains a limiting factor: If the tenant has abandoned or voluntarily
surrendered the premises, the rule does not apply.5 ' Obviously, in
in Texas, as noted in Berg, is that Gulf Oil "left open the possibility that self-help may
be available in that state to dispossess a tenant in some undefined circumstances
which may be found peaceable." 264 N.W.2d at 150 (emphasis added). A similar result
could have followed in Minnesota if the Berg court had not gone beyond its initial
holding that Wiley's reentry was forcible and adopted the minority rule prohibiting all
self-help evictions, whether peaceable or forcible.
41. 264 N.W.2d at 151.
42. Id. at 149-50.
43. MINN. STAT. § 566.01-.17 (1978).
44. Strand v. Hand, 178 Minn. 460, 463, 227 N.W. 656, 657 (1929).
45. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Berg, 187 Minn. 503, 505, 246 N.W. 9, 10,
(1932).
46. MINN. STAT. § 566.05 (1978).
47. Id. § 556.175.
48. Id. § 504.26.
49. Id. § 504.25.




cases of abandonment or surrender, 2 a landlord should not be re-
quired to go to court to repossess premises that the former tenant no
longer claims. In such circumstances, the landlord's reentry will not
thwart the policy of discouraging self-help and the resulting violence.
Although the Berg court referred only to written leases,5 3 the
dominant objective of discouraging self-help-avoiding possible
breaches of the peace-would be advanced by a proscription of self-
help in oral leases as well. It seems certain, in light of the rationale
underlying a prohibition of self-help, that the court did not intend
such a limitation;5" landlords would be well advised, therefore, to
avoid using self-help regardless of whether the lease is oral or written.
Because Berg involved a commercial tenant, its application to
residential tenants may be questioned. No policy reasons exist, how-
ever, for refusing to give residential tenants the protection of the Berg
rule. Several policy considerations suggest instead that Berg should
be extended to residential tenants. First, extending the rule would
further the policy of discouraging violence;, self-help repossession is
more likely to lead to violence in a residential setting than in a com-
mercial setting." Second, in certain circumstances, Minnesota law
currently provides greater protection to residential tenants than to
commercial tenants;5" restricting Berg to commercial tenants would
be inconsistent with this policy. Furthermore, no other jurisdiction
that follows the rule espoused in Berg applies it exclusively to com-
mercial tenants." It is thus probable that the Berg rule will be ex-
52. In subsequent self-help reentry cases, counsel for defendant landlords are
likely to argue for broader definitions of abandonment and surrender to avoid the
application of Berg. It is unlikely, however, that such definitions will be adopted in
light of the policies underlying Berg.
53. 264 N.W.2d at 151.
54. Further, the common law rule made no distinction between tenants holding
under oral leases and those holding under written leases. See, e.g., Lobdell v. Keene,
85 Minn. 90, 95-96, 88 N.W. 426, 428 (1901).
55. Both emotional and practical considerations suggest that being dispossessed
of one's residence is more personally threatening than losing possession of commercial
property and is thus more likely to result in violence. One who is removed from his
home not only suffers the psychological loss of his personal dwelling but also may have
great difficulty satisfying his immediate need for shelter. A violent response by the
tenant is therefore much more likely in a residential dispossession than in a commer-
cial dispossession, where provisions for basic human needs are generally not threat-
ened.
56. The following Minnesota statutes apply exclusively to residential tenants:
MINN. STAT. § 566.175 (1978) (see text accompanying note 47 supra); id. § 504.25 (1978)
(see text accompanying note 49 supra); id. § 504.26 (1978) (see text accompanying note
48 supra); id. § 504.18 (1978) (statutory covenants of habitability); id. § 504.20 (secu-
rity deposit statute); id. § 504.22 (disclosure legislation); id. § 504.24 (property aban-
donment provision); and id. §§ 566.18-.33 (substandard housing statute).
57. In states that have, by judicial decision, adopted a rule disfavoring self-help,
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tended to give residential tenants who are dispossessed by self-help
a damage action against their landlords.
Damage actions against landlords, however, may not be effective
in deterring self-help in residential settings. If the tenant is a com-
mercial one, the landlord's liability for actual damages could be sub-
stantial because the tenant's lost profits are recoverable. 5 Since a
residential tenant's actual damages, on the other hand, may be insig-
nificant, the threat of liability would be less likely to discourage
landlords from using self-help. The holding in Berg that self-help
repossessions are unlawful,59 however, makes other statutory penal-
ties applicable." These penalties, combined with the availability of
punitive damages in appropriate cases,6 ' will ensure that residential
landlords comply with Berg.6"
the courts have not distinguished between commercial and residential tenants. In
states that have statutes prohibiting self-help repossession of residential property, self-
help in commercial settings may still be allowed. For example, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:39-1 (West Supp. 1978) prohibits any entry not made pursuant to legal process into
solely residential property. Self-help reentries are therefore presumably allowed if the
property is not residential. See Zankman v. Tireno Towers, 121 N.J. Super. 346, 348-
49, 297 A.2d 23, 24-25 (Bergen County Dist. Ct. 1972). See also Tanella v. Rettagliata,
120 N.J. Super. 400, 410-11, 294 A.2d 431, 436-37 (Bergen County Dist. Ct. 1972).
58. In Berg, lost profits in the amount of $31,000 were awarded. 264 N.W.2d at
148.
59. The court held that, "subsequent to their decision in this case, the only
lawful means to dispossess a tenant who has not abandoned nor voluntarily surren-
dered but who claims possession adversely to a landlord's claim of breach of a written
lease is by resort to judicial process." Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
60. MINN. STAT. § 566.175 (1978) allows tenants who are unlawfully removed or
excluded from lands or tenements to recover possession. MINN. STAT. § 504.25 (1978)
makes it a misdemeanor to unlawfully and intentionally remove or exclude a tenant
from lands or tenements.
61. The Minnesota Supreme Court has affirmed awards of punitive damages to
unlawfully evicted tenants. See Sweeney v. Meyers, 199 Minn. 21, 24, 270 N.W. 906,
907 (1937); Bronson Steel Arch Shoe Co. v. T.K. Kelly Inv. Co., 183 Minn. 135, 139,
236 N.W. 204, 206 (1931). Punitive damages may be awarded in Minnesota if the
following conditions are met:
1. The party must be entitled to actual damages before punitive damages will
be awarded. Erickson v. Pomerank, 66 Minn. 376, 377, 69 N.W. 39, 39 (1896).
2. The action must be in tort, not in contract. Beaulieu v. Great N. Ry. Co., 103
Minn. 47, 53, 114 N.W. 353, 355 (1907).
3. The wrongful act must have been done willfully, wantonly and maliciously.
Mere negligence is not enough. As used here, malice means only the willful violation
of a known right; spitefulness is immaterial. Johnson v. Radde, 293 Minn. 409, 410,
196 N.W.2d 478, 480 (1972); Benson Coop. Creamery Ass'n v. First Dist. Ass'n, 276
Minn. 520, 528-29, 151 N.W.2d 422, 427-28 (1967).
62. One might suggest that MINN. STAT. § 557.08 (1978), which authorizes treble
damages for forcible evictions, should be applied to all self-help eviction cases in order
to encourage compliance with Berg. Past judicial interpretations of the statute limit
its application to cases that, in the judgment of the trial court, involve unusual force
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Berg also has the effect of invalidating lease clauses that confer
upon the landlord a right of reentry in case of breach. In Berg, the
court did not specifically address the validity of the express reentry
clause contained in the lease . 3 But in holding that a landlord may
never use self-help against a tenant claiming possession, the court
must first have implicitly concluded that a right of reentry clause has
no binding effect on the parties. Although thus invalidated by Berg,
reentry clauses may continue to be written into leases. If a tenant is
unaware that a reentry clause included in his lease is unenforceable,
the clause may either deter him from challenging a self-help eviction
by the landlord, or cause him to move if the landlord threatens a self-
help eviction. Hence, to ensure that the effectiveness of the Berg rule
is not diminished by any in terrorem effects of reentry clauses, the
court or the legislature should specifically prohibit the inclusion of
such clauses in leases.
A further implication of the rule adopted in Berg is that tenants
will have the opportunity to present any defenses to their eviction at
the required judicial proceeding." Formerly, tenants evicted through
self-help had no opportunity to present defenses until after the evic-
tion, 5 and then only by initiating an action against the landlord.
Berg's implicit modification of this rule is especially significant be-
cause recent statutes and court decisions have expanded the range of
that "tend[s] to bring about a breach of the peace." Poppen v. Wadleigh, 235 Minn.
400, 407, 51 N.W.2d 75, 79 (1952) (quoting Fults v. Munro, 202 N.Y. 34, 42, 95 N.E.
23, 26 (1911)). See Behrendt v. Rassmussen, 234 Minn. 97, 101, 47 N.W.2d 779, 782
(1951). In view of the availability of compensatory and punitive damages and the
statutory penalties that can be imposed for unlawful evictions, see note 60 supra,
expansion of the treble damages remedy to all self-help evictions appears unnecessary.
Although the trial court in Berg found Wiley's reentry to be forcible, 264 N.W.2d
at 149, Berg's motion for treble damages under MINN. STAT. § 557.08 (1978) was denied.
Appellants' Brief, app. at A-43. The Minnesota Supreme Court implicitly used two
different definitions of "forcible" in affirming this result. One was the definition ap-
plied to the common law right of reentry and was equivalent to entry not pursuant to
judicial process. See note 40 supra. The other definition, applied to MiNN. STAT.
§ 557.08 (1978), involved the concept of actual or unusual force. The court's inconsist-
ent use of the term "forcible" might have led to inconsistent results in subsequent
cases if the court had confined its analysis to the common law rule rather than adopt-
ing the minority rule.
63. See note 2 supra.
64. MINN. STAT. § 566.07 (1978) provides in part that the defendant in an unlaw-
ful detainer proceeding may answer the complaint with "all matters in excuse, justifi-
cation, or avoidance of the allegations thereof."
65. See Edwards v. C.N. Inv. Co., 27 Ohio Misc. 57, 61, 272 N.E.2d 652, 655
(Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1971): "Plaintiff, herein may have had some defense to an
action in forcible entry and detainer; on the other hand, he may have had none. But
this can never be determined inasmuch as he was peremptorily deprived of his right
to resort to the processes of the courts."
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defenses to unlawful detainer proceedings. Since 1970, retaliatory
eviction," failure to comply with statutory disclosure requirements,67
and breach of the covenants of habitability," have been recognized
as valid defenses for residential tenants.
Landlords who have used self-help evictions are likely to be dis-
satisfied with Berg. They will argue that the required judicial pro-
ceedings will cause unnecessary delays in removing tenants and will
result in the loss of rental income." In practice, however, Berg may
not impose significant burdens on landlords. The required proceed-
ings are summary and can result in restitution of the premises within
three to ten days after the complaint is filed °.7 Additional delays may
occur, of course, but delays of more than several days require the
defendant to post bond to cover the rent that will accrue as well as
the costs of the action.71 Another aspect of the delay problem is the
possibility that tenants may damage premises before repossession.
The court in Berg foresaw this and noted that several remedies are
available to the landlord, including law enforcement protection, tem-
porary restraining orders under Rule 65 of the Minnesota Rules of
66. Subdivision 2 of the retaliatory eviction statute, MINN. STAT. § 566.03 (1978),
specifies that retaliatory eviction is a defense to an action for recovery of premises. See
Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 307 Minn. 423, 426-27, 240 N.W.2d 828, 830-31 (1976).
67. The disclosure statute, MINN. STAT. § 504.22 (1978), requires that certain
information about the management and ownership of the premises be disclosed to the
tenant. Subdivision 5 provides that no action to recover the premises can be main-
tained unless the information has been disclosed or was otherwise known to the tenant.
68. The statutory covenants of habitability are found in MINN. STAT. § 504.18
(1978). Breach of the covenants was held to be a valid defense to unlawful detainer
proceedings in Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 59, 213 N.W.2d 339, 342 (1973).
69. They may also argue that they are now required to incur court expenses to
regain possession. The forcible entry statute recognizes this problem and provides that
the person in whose favor judgment is given is entitled to court costs. MINN. STAT. §
566.09 (1978). It is probable, however, that the landlord will not recover court costs,
especially if the unlawful detainer action is brought for nonpayment of rent.
70. Id. § 566.01-.17.
71. If personal service of the defendant cannot be made, an additional delay may
occur. See id. § 566.06. At trial, adjournment for no more than six days beyond the
trial date may be had without the consent of the parties; adjournment for more than
six days may be had under specified circumstances if the defendant gives bond equal-
ing rent, costs, and damages. Id. § 566.08. Upon judgment for the plaintiff, the writ of
restitution against the defendant may be stayed for no more than seven days upon a
showing of substantial hardship, except that no stay may extend later than three days
prior to the date the rent is next due. See id. § 566.09. The writ of restitution will also
be stayed upon appeal by the defendant, provided bond is posted. See id. § 566.12. If
the appellant is a holdover tenant, the writ may be issued notwithstanding the appeal,
provided the plaintiff gives bond equaling costs and damages. See id. § 566.11-.12.
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Civil Procedure,7 2 injunctions against waste, and damage actions.7 3
Berg replaces the common law rule previously followed in Minne-
sota with the more modem doctrine that prohibits self-help reposses-
sions unless the tenant has surrendered or abandoned possession. The
inconveniences to landlords that may result from this new rule are
outweighed by its benefits. Violent repossessions will occur less fre-
quently, and tenants will be assured of a fair hearing. The decision
places Minnesota among the growing number of states that recognize
that "[iln our modem society, with the availability of prompt and
sufficient legal remedies. . . . there is no place and no need for self-
help against a tenant in claimed lawful possession of leased prem-
ises." 4
72. The authors of Rule 65 specifically foresaw circumstances in which tempo-
rary restraining orders would be issued without prior notice to the restrained party in
order to prevent that party from "acting in a manner which [would] render moot the
order sought." 3 J. Hmrm & 0. ADAmSON, MINmSorA PRACTIcE 102 (1970).
73. Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d at 151 & n.8 (Minn. 1978).
74. Id. at 151.
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